## Free variables are not “implicitly universally quantified”!

Mathematicians are often confused about the meaning of variables. I hear them say “a free variable is implicitly universally quantified”, by which they mean that it is ok to equate a formula $\phi$ with a free variable $x$ with its universal closure $\forall x \,.\, \phi$. I am addressing this post to those who share this opinion.

## Substitution is pullback

I am sitting on a tutorial on categorical semantics of dependent type theory given by Peter Lumsdaine. He is talking about categories with attributes and other variants of categories that come up in the semantics of dependent type theory. He is amazingly good at fielding questions about definitional equality from the type theorists. And it looks like some people are puzzling over pullbacks showing up, which Peter is about to explain using syntactic categories. Here is a pedestrian explanation of a very important fact:

Substitution is pullback.

## On the Bourbaki-Witt Principle in Toposes

With Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine.

Abstract: The Bourbaki-Witt principle states that any progressive map on a chain-complete poset has a fixed point above every point. It is provable classically, but not intuitionistically. We study this and related principles in an intuitionistic setting. Among other things, we show that Bourbaki-Witt fails exactly when the trichotomous ordinals form a set, but does not [...]

## Constructive gem: an injection from Baire space to natural numbers

I am not sure whether to call this one a constructive gem or stone. I suppose it is a matter of personal taste. I think it is a gem, albeit a very unusual one: there is a topos in which $\mathbb{N}^\mathbb{N}$ can be embedded into $\mathbb{N}$. Continue reading Constructive gem: an injection from Baire space to natural numbers

## Running a classical proof with choice in Agda

As a preparation for my part of a joint tutorial Programs from proofs at MFPS 27 at the end of this month with Ulrich Berger, Monika Seisenberger, and Paulo Oliva, I’ve developed in Agda some things we’ve been doing together.

Using

Berardi-Bezem-Coquand functional, or alternatively,
Berger-Oliva modified bar recursion, or alternatively,
Escardo-Oliva countable product of selection functions,

for giving a [...]

## The Dialectica interpertation in Coq

I think I am getting addicted to Coq, or more generally to doing mathematics, including the proofs, with computers. I spent last week finalizing a formalization of Gödel’s functional interpretation of logic, also known as the Dialectica interpretation. There does not seem to be one available already, which is a good opportunity for a blog post.

## Proof of negation and proof by contradiction

I am discovering that mathematicians cannot tell the difference between “proof by contradiction” and “proof of negation”. This is so for good reasons, but conflation of different kinds of proofs is bad mental hygiene which leads to bad teaching practice and confusion. For reference, here is a short explanation of the difference between proof of negation and proof by contradiction. Continue reading Proof of negation and proof by contradiction

## Efficient computation with Dedekind reals

Two versions of this talk were given at Computability and complexity in analysis 2008 and at Mathematics, Algorithms and Proofs 2008.

Joint work with Paul Taylor.

Abstract: Cauchy’s construction of reals as sequences of rational approximations is the theoretical basis for a number of implementations of exact real numbers, while Dedekind’s construction of reals as cuts has inspired [...]

## The hydra game

Today I lectured about the Hydra game by Laurence Kirby and Jeff Paris (Accessible Independence Results for Peano Arithmetic, Kirby and Paris, Bull. London Math. Soc. 1982; 14: 285-293). For the occasion I implemented the game in Java. I am publishing the code for anyone who wants to play, or use it for teaching. Continue reading The hydra game

## Are small sentences of Peano arithmetic decidable?

Recently there has been a discussion (here, here, here, and here) on the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list about completeness of Peano arithmetic (PA) with respect to “small” sentences. Harvey Friedman made several conjectures of the following kind: “All true small sentences of PA are provable.” He proposed measures of smallness, such as counting the number of distinct variables or restricting the depth of terms. Here are some statistics concerning such statements.