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	<title>Comments on: How many is two?</title>
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	<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/</link>
	<description>Mathematics for computers</description>
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		<title>By: Andrej Bauer</title>
		<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/comment-page-1/#comment-12446</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrej Bauer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2009 18:34:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Dear Yoav, the options you are mentioning are not valid within the context of this discussion.

1. Preburger arithmetic is a very limited subset of Peano arithmetic which does not even contain multiplication. When we speak of &lt;i&gt;natural&lt;/i&gt; numbers we mean Peano arithmetic. So, you have to consider all functions `f : NN -&gt; 2` definable in Peano arithmetic, and it is impossible to decide whether such a function in general will always output `1` (actually, this already cannot be done for primitive recursive functions, which are a small subfamily of all number-theoretic functions). To put it in another way, of course by changing the assumptions you can draw a different conclusion.

2. Tarski&#039;s axioms are for real closed fields, not natural numbers. The set of natural numbers is not definable in Tarski&#039;s theory. So your second remarks is not relevant because I was talking about function `NN -&gt; 2`, not reals.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Yoav, the options you are mentioning are not valid within the context of this discussion.</p>
<p>1. Preburger arithmetic is a very limited subset of Peano arithmetic which does not even contain multiplication. When we speak of <i>natural</i> numbers we mean Peano arithmetic. So, you have to consider all functions `f : NN -> 2` definable in Peano arithmetic, and it is impossible to decide whether such a function in general will always output `1` (actually, this already cannot be done for primitive recursive functions, which are a small subfamily of all number-theoretic functions). To put it in another way, of course by changing the assumptions you can draw a different conclusion.</p>
<p>2. Tarski&#8217;s axioms are for real closed fields, not natural numbers. The set of natural numbers is not definable in Tarski&#8217;s theory. So your second remarks is not relevant because I was talking about function `NN -> 2`, not reals.</p>
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		<title>By: Yoav</title>
		<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/comment-page-1/#comment-12442</link>
		<dc:creator>Yoav</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2009 13:30:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>1. You said &quot;If you are correct in your belief that `2 = Omega`, you should be able to write a program that takes as input a boolean function `f : NN -&gt; 2` and outputs the truth value `forall n in N. f(n)`. Can you do it?&quot; I can, if the theory is decidable, like &#039;Presburger Arithmetic&#039; and the &#039;Tarski&#039;s axioms of Euclidian Geometry&#039;

2. Another option of existing more than two truth values on `Omega` is when there are independent sentences on the theory, like the &#039;Goodstein&#039;s theorem&#039; on &#039;Peano axioms&#039;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. You said &#8220;If you are correct in your belief that `2 = Omega`, you should be able to write a program that takes as input a boolean function `f : NN -&gt; 2` and outputs the truth value `forall n in N. f(n)`. Can you do it?&#8221; I can, if the theory is decidable, like &#8216;Presburger Arithmetic&#8217; and the &#8216;Tarski&#8217;s axioms of Euclidian Geometry&#8217;</p>
<p>2. Another option of existing more than two truth values on `Omega` is when there are independent sentences on the theory, like the &#8216;Goodstein&#8217;s theorem&#8217; on &#8216;Peano axioms&#8217;</p>
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		<title>By: Thad Coons</title>
		<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/comment-page-1/#comment-26</link>
		<dc:creator>Thad Coons</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 May 2005 17:15:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The failure of many rules of inference does appear to be of the strongest arguments against Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic. But apparently no one has noticed that it&#039;s possible to develop his logic in a way that does establish these rules of inference given certain reasonable conditions. My results have some features that are much like intuitionism. Since I&#039;m an amateur with &lt;a href=&quot;http://indeplearn.blogspot.com/2005/05/three-valued-logic-beginnings.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;radically unorthodox&lt;/a&gt; ideas and not an expert on intuitionistic logic, I&#039;m interested in comparing them. Please bear with me.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The failure of many rules of inference does appear to be of the strongest arguments against Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic. But apparently no one has noticed that it&#8217;s possible to develop his logic in a way that does establish these rules of inference given certain reasonable conditions. My results have some features that are much like intuitionism. Since I&#8217;m an amateur with <a href="http://indeplearn.blogspot.com/2005/05/three-valued-logic-beginnings.html" rel="nofollow">radically unorthodox</a> ideas and not an expert on intuitionistic logic, I&#8217;m interested in comparing them. Please bear with me.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrej Bauer</title>
		<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/comment-page-1/#comment-25</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrej Bauer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 May 2005 15:14:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>
You are correct. Bivalence is not valid in intuitionistic logic, whereas noncontradiction is.



There is a lot of confusion about what it means to have two-valued logic (which is why I wrote this post). Lukasiewicz&#039;s three-valued logic is not a model of intuitionistic logic, because some rules of inference are not valid in it. I was not talking about just any arbitrary thing that anyone might call logic, but rather specifically about intuitionistic logic. But that does not matter since we can find models of intuitionistic logic which seemingly have &quot;three values&quot;, for example the topos of presheaves on the category consistig of two objects and an arrow between them. In fact, given any Heyting algebra `H` with as many points as you like, you can find a model of intuitionistic logic, namely the `H`-valued sets, such that `Omega` is the set `H` (with a suitably defined `H`-valued equality predicate). But now it is important not to confuse the question &quot;How many points does `H` have?&quot; with the question &quot;&lt;b&gt;Inside&lt;/b&gt; the model, how many points does `Omega` have?&quot;. Inside the model you can prove the validity of the statement `not exists p in Omega . (p != TT and p != _&#124;_)`, but in the metatheory you can easily find a Heyting algebra `H` with more than two points. Please do not confuse a theory with meta-theory.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You are correct. Bivalence is not valid in intuitionistic logic, whereas noncontradiction is.</p>
<p>There is a lot of confusion about what it means to have two-valued logic (which is why I wrote this post). Lukasiewicz&#8217;s three-valued logic is not a model of intuitionistic logic, because some rules of inference are not valid in it. I was not talking about just any arbitrary thing that anyone might call logic, but rather specifically about intuitionistic logic. But that does not matter since we can find models of intuitionistic logic which seemingly have &#8220;three values&#8221;, for example the topos of presheaves on the category consistig of two objects and an arrow between them. In fact, given any Heyting algebra `H` with as many points as you like, you can find a model of intuitionistic logic, namely the `H`-valued sets, such that `Omega` is the set `H` (with a suitably defined `H`-valued equality predicate). But now it is important not to confuse the question &#8220;How many points does `H` have?&#8221; with the question &#8220;<b>Inside</b> the model, how many points does `Omega` have?&#8221;. Inside the model you can prove the validity of the statement `not exists p in Omega . (p != TT and p != _|_)`, but in the metatheory you can easily find a Heyting algebra `H` with more than two points. Please do not confuse a theory with meta-theory.</p>
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		<title>By: Thad Coons</title>
		<link>http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/16/how-many-is-two/comment-page-1/#comment-24</link>
		<dc:creator>Thad Coons</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2005 19:27:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://math.andrej.com/2005/05/15/how-many-is-two/#comment-24</guid>
		<description>I have understood the law of the excluded middle as having two classically equivalent formulations: bivalence (p v ~P) and noncontradition ~(p &amp; ~p). It appears to me that you are rejecting bivalence but accepting noncontradiction.
I&#039;m astonished to learn that I cannot have three logical values, since Lukasieiwicz invented his 3-valued logic in 1920, and I&#039;ve been working with it for some 20 years myself. Could you reference the proof?
If you&#039;re talking about the proof in coq, I believe this is likely to include some implicit assumptions that I might not accept.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have understood the law of the excluded middle as having two classically equivalent formulations: bivalence (p v ~P) and noncontradition ~(p &amp; ~p). It appears to me that you are rejecting bivalence but accepting noncontradiction.<br />
I&#8217;m astonished to learn that I cannot have three logical values, since Lukasieiwicz invented his 3-valued logic in 1920, and I&#8217;ve been working with it for some 20 years myself. Could you reference the proof?<br />
If you&#8217;re talking about the proof in coq, I believe this is likely to include some implicit assumptions that I might not accept.</p>
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